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1 Introduction
The last financial crisis has shed the light on the problem of large public debt in
developed countries, in particular in Europe. In many advanced countries, debt
levels have increased dramatically during the two last decades, now reaching
extremely high amounts. The control of the growth rate of public spendings has
became a major concern for economists and policy-makers while public deficits
digging. A heavily indebted country may appear as fragile, for many reasons,
among which solvency, or simply because it is unlikely to raise sufficient funds
to deal with a large negative shock on its economy. The Maastricht treaty
introduced a rule on the maximal amount a country may contract, limiting the
debt to 60% of GDP, but this limit has been exceeded by almost all european
countries. Indeed, most advanced countries are characterized both by large
amounts of public debt and large fluctuations of GDP. Given this fact, two
types of questions become central. The first concerns the relationship between
the level of debt and growth, the second focuses on the relationship between
macroeconomic stability and debt level. But whereas the literature has focused
recently on the first question, little attention has been paid to the second.
While subject to a recent controversy,1 the paper of Reinhart and Rogoff
(2010) indeed shows that a gross public debt exceeding 90% of nominal GDP on
a sustained basis may have a significant negative impact on the growth rate.2
On the basis of this type of result, the IMF has strongly advised European
countries over the last years to decrease their debt. The main objective was
to boost growth but also to stabilize the economies. Indeed, since 2008, most
advanced economies have been characterized by large fluctuations of GDP.
In a OECD Economics Department Policy note, Sutherland, Hoeller,
1See Herndon, Ash and Pollin (2013).
2See also Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff (2012).
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Merola and Ziemann (2012) argue that the level of government debt has a
significative impact on business cycle characteristics. They identify the char-
acteristics of a “low debt” business cycle and a “high debt” business cycle
aggregating the countries according to their level of debt. In countries with
high debt, the cycle is more pronounced, with phases of expansions longer and
larger and recessions also more pronounced. The arguments for such differences
usually rely on the “vulnerability” of high public debt economies. Government
then have less latitude to run the appropriate fiscal policy in case of negative
shocks. Moreover, Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Ve`gh (2013) show that the impact
of governments expenditure shocks depends crucially on public indebtness, as
the fiscal multipliers seems to be lower in high debt countries.
This paper proposes to study the question of the relationship between debt
and fluctuations in the simple framework of the neoclassical Ramsey model
(1928). Our aim is to precisely discuss the effect of public debt on the macroe-
conomic stability of one country in the optimal growth model. As we focus on
business cycle properties, we will consider a model with heterogeneous agents,
which allows the emergence of endogenous fluctuations. Actually, in the stan-
dard Ramsey (1928) model with one representative agent, one sector and usual
assumptions, the economy monotonically converges to the steady state. With
many agents, conclusions may differ: Introducing borrowing constraints, the
Ramsey conjecture holds at the steady state, i.e. the most patient holds all
the capital (Becker (1980)). Dynamics can be non-monotone and endogenous
cycles can occur around the steady state for a weak elasticity of capital-labor
substitution, i.e. when capital income monotonicity fails (Becker and Foias
(1987, 1994)).3
We focus on government intervention as a source of macroeconomic fluc-
3See also Sorger (1994) for the existence of more complex dynamics.
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tuations when government spending is financed through taxes on income and
public debt. Public spending is useful because it improves households’ utility
of consumption as an externality. Even with linear income taxation, endoge-
nous fluctuations (flip bifurcation) become compatible with plausible values
of the elasticity of capital-labor substitution in the economy without debt.4
When public debt is introduced as a fixed proportion of GDP, we show that
it can have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect depending on the value of the
elasticity of capital-labor substitution.
If the elasticity of capital labor substitution is low, and the marginal util-
ity of consumption with respect to public spendings is weak, i.e. the variation
of individuals’ welfare is not very sensitive to variations of the available pub-
lic good, we prove that public debt can have a destabilizing effect. Indeed,
economies characterized by a high level of the debt-output ratio are more
subject to fluctuations. They can actually experience endogenous oscillations
whereas the same economies are characterized by saddle-point stability if their
level of debt is low.
Conversely, when the elasticity of capital labor substitution is high enough,
and the elasticity of the marginal utility with respect to public spendings is
large, i.e. the variation of individuals’ welfare is very sensitive to variations of
the available public good, we prove that public debt has a strong stabilizing
effect. Indeed a large enough amount of public debt can stabilize the economy
by guaranteeing monotone convergence toward the steady state.
The destabilizing effect of public debt associated to cases where public
spending does not matter a lot for agents decisions can be explained follow-
4In Nishimura et al. (2013), the existence of endogenous fluctuations through the oc-
currence of local indeterminacy is analyzed in a Ramsey model with government spending,
financed from a constant income tax only, and endogenous labor.
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ing an intuition which is closely related to the intuition given by Becker and
Foias (1987, 1994). Without debt, endogenous fluctuations indeed occur only
when the elasticity of capital-labor substitution is low enough, meaning that
the “capital income monotonicity” fails. Capital income is then a decreasing
function of capital and a high capital at one period is compatible with a lower
investment at the next period. For indebted countries, as now the most patient
agents own both assets, capital and debt, endogenous fluctuations occur when
the “asset income monotonicity” fails, which is less restrictive and thus true
for larger sets of values for the elasticity of capital labor substitution. The set
of economies subject to these fluctuations is then larger if the economies are
sufficiently indebted.
The stabilizing effect of public debt associated to cases where public spend-
ing matters a lot for agents decisions can be explained as follows. Assume that
the elasticity of capital labor substitution is large enough and that at a given
period, capital is high, meaning income is high. Fluctuations occur if the con-
sumer’s intertemporal trade-off is compatible with a decrease of capital at the
following period, associated to a higher return to capital.
Without debt, public spending is procyclical, following mechanically the
capital labor ratio through taxes on income, and endogenous fluctuations are
compatible with the intertemporal trade-off. But when public spending is also
related to the repayment of a previous debt and the contraction of a new one,
it can be countercyclical, and the fluctuations cannot occur anymore as they
become incompatible with the intertemporal trade-off. Thus when the welfare
associated to consumption depends strongly of the level of public spendings, a
high enough amount of debt can prevent the existence of endogenous fluctua-
tions.5
5See also Bom and Lighthart (2014) for related results in a small open economy with
4
We finally show that, depending on the value of the elasticity of capital-
labor substitution, public debt can be used at the same time to stabilize the
economy and to affect the degree of inequalities. Indeed, when capital and
labor are weakly substitutable, a low debt can stabilize and decrease the in-
equalities as capital is growing. On the contrary, when the elasticity of capital-
labor substitution is larger, a large debt can stabilize and decrease or increase
the inequalities as capital is growing depending on whether the elasticity has
intermediary or large values.
This paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in the next
section. Section 3 is devoted to the steady state analysis. In section 4, we study
the occurrence of endogenous business cycles and economic interpretations.
Section 5 provides some concluding remarks. Proof and technical details are
provided in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a discrete time economy (t = 0, 1, ...,∞), with three types of
agents, heterogeneous households, firms and a government.
2.1 Households
There are H heterogeneous infinitely lived households, indexed by i = 1, . . . , H
with H > 2, who supply inelastically labor and face borrowing constraints.
They have heterogeneous capital and debt endowments (ki0, bi0 > 0), and
heterogeneous preferences, i.e. different discount factors and different instan-
taneous utilities in consumption. Households are ranked according to their
discount factors: 0 ≤ βH ≤ . . . ≤ β2 < β1 < 1.
overlapping generations.
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Household i derives utility for consumption cit at period t. Moreover, we
assume that public spending Gt affects welfare, as an externality on utility
for consumption. Utility is non separable between consumption and public
spending at each period, but separable over time:
+∞∑
t=0
βtiui (cit, Gt) (1)
Public spending thus corresponds to a pure public good providing services to
consumers, e.g. schools, infrastructures, ....
Each household derives income from wage, capital and government bonds
that allow to finance public debt. Denote rt the real interest rate on physical
capital, r¯t the return of government bonds, wt the real wage and δ ∈ (0, 1)
the rate of depreciation of capital. In addition, each household pays taxes on
labor income, capital income and on the remuneration of bonds’ holding, at
a constant rate τ ∈ (0, 1).6 Any household i maximizes (1) facing the budget
constraint:
cit + kit+1 + bit+1 = (1− τ)[rtkit + wt + r¯tbit] + (1− δ)kit, (2)
and the borrowing constraint on individual capital and government bonds hold-
ing kit, bit ≥ 0. The utility function satisfies the following assumption:
Assumption 1. ui (ci, G) is a continuous function defined on [0,+∞) ×
[0,+∞), and C2 on (0,+∞) × (0,+∞). ui (ci, G) is strictly increasing
(uic (ci, G) > 0), strictly concave (uicc (ci, G) < 0) with respect to its first argu-
ment, and the marginal utility of consumption increases with respect to public
spending (uicG (ci, G) > 0).7 For further reference, we introduce the following
6We could assume different tax rates on labor income, capital income and remuneration
of bonds, but this does not alter our results.
7We denote uixj (x1, x2) = ∂ui(x1, x2)/∂xj and uixjxh(x1, x2) = ∂
2ui(x1, x2)/∂xj∂xh.
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elasticities:8
icc ≡ −uiccci/uic > 0, icG ≡ uicGG/uic > 0 (3)
In addition, the Inada condition limci→0 uic (ci, G) = +∞ is satisfied.
We consider here that private consumption and government services are Edge-
worth complements, icG ≥ 0, following Ni (1995) who provides empirical sup-
port for this assumption.
Utility maximization gives:
uic (cit, Gt)
uic (cit+1, Gt+1)
≥ βiRt+1, with equality when kit+1 > 0 (4)
uic (cit, Gt)
uic (cit+1, Gt+1)
≥ βi(1− τ)r¯t+1, with equality when bit+1 > 0 (5)
with Rt+1 = (1− τ)rt+1 + 1− δ and the transversality conditions
lim
t→+∞
βtiuic (cit, Gt) kit+1 = 0 and lim
t→+∞
βtiuic (cit, Gt) bit+1 = 0 (6)
Note that for all i = 1, . . . , H, cit are forward variables while kit and bit are
predetermined variables.
2.2 Firms
A representative firm produces the final good yt, using capital kt and labor lt
under a constant returns to scale technology yt = F (kt, lt). As labor is inelastic
and there are H ≥ 1 households who supply one unit of labor, aggregate labor
is constant, lt = H. Therefore, following Becker (1980) and Becker and Foias
(1987), we denote F (kt, H) ≡ f(kt). The production function f (k) satisfies:
Assumption 2. f (k) is a continuous function defined on [0,+∞) and C2 on
(0,+∞), strictly increasing (f ′ (k) > 0) and strictly concave (f ′′ (k) < 0). In
8For simplicity, we omit the arguments of the functions.
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addition, the conditions limk→0 f ′ (k) = +∞ and limk→+∞ f ′ (k) < θ/[β1(1 −
τ)], with θ ≡ 1− β1(1− δ), are satisfied.
Profit maximization gives:
rt = f
′ (kt) ≡ r (kt) (7)
and due to constant returns to scale and perfect competition, profits are zero,
so that
Hwt = f (kt)− rtkt ≡ Ω (kt) (8)
In the following, we denote by s (k) ≡ kf ′ (k) /f (k) ∈ (0, 1) the capital share
in total income and σ (k) ≡ [s (k)− 1] f ′ (k) / [kf ′′ (k)] ≥ 0 the elasticity of
capital-labor substitution. We derive the following useful relationships:
r′(k)k/r(k) ≡ −(1− s(k))/σ(k) and Ω′(k)k/Ω(k) ≡ s(k)/σ(k) (9)
2.3 Government
Public spending Gt is financed by total income taxation and debt. Since
yt =
∑H
i=1 rtkit + Hwt, the budget constraint faced by the government at
period t writes:
Gt + r¯tbt = τ(yt + r¯tbt) + bt+1 (10)
where τ ∈ (0, 1) is the constant proportional tax rate on households’ total
income. Here, bt corresponds to the stock of real debt used to finance public
investment. As a consequence, bt is a predetermined variable as capital.
Total public expenditures, that are the sum of public spendings Gt and the
reimbursement of debt contracted the previous period r¯tbt, are financed by the
new issue of debt bt+1 and taxation of (capital and labor) income and of remu-
neration of bonds. In order to match the constraint imposed by the Maastricht
treaty, we will assume that public debt cannot exceed a fixed proportion α > 0
of GDP, namely
bt ≤ αyt
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We will focus in the following on equilibria where this constraint is binding,
i.e. bt = αyt. The case without debt is of course obtained when α = 0 and α
is defined as the debt-output ratio. Note that when the constraint is binding,
α can also be interpreted as a policy parameter that allows to manage public
debt excluding its explosive path (see de la Croix and Michel (2002), p.230-
233). The parameter α will allow us to discuss the stability properties of the
economy according to the level of the debt-output ratio.
2.4 Intertemporal equilibrium
An intertemporal equilibrium can be defined as follows:
Definition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, an equilibrium is a sequence
(rt, r¯t, wt, kt, bt, Gt, (kit, bit, cit)
H
i=1)
+∞
t=0 satisfying the optimal behavior of house-
holds (2), (4), (5) and (6), profit maximization (7) and (8), the government
constraint (10), the equilibrium conditions on the asset markets kt =
∑H
i=1 kit
and bt =
∑H
i=1 bit = αf(kt), and the no-arbitrage condition (1 − τ)r¯t =
1 − δ + (1 − τ)rt, the equilibrium on the labor market being satisfied since
lt = H.
The existence of the intertemporal equilibrium is an issue that we do not
address in this paper. The interested reader can refer to Becker et al. (1991),
Bosi and Seegmuller (2010) or Becker et al. (2013). In the next section,
we show the existence of a steady state. Since we focus on local dynamics
around such an equilibrium, we consider that, by continuity, an intertemporal
equilibrium exists in a neighborhood of the steady state.
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3 Steady state analysis
Since the tax rate on income is constant, we can derive the existence of a
steady state along which the equality R = (1− τ)r¯ holds as physical capital k
and governments bonds b are perfectly substitutable saving assets.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, let α ∈ [0, αˆ) with αˆ = τβ1/(1−
β1). Then there exists a steady state defined by the following properties:
(S1) r = f ′(k) = θ/[β1(1− τ)], r¯ = R/(1− τ) = f ′ (k) + (1− δ)/(1− τ) and
w = [f(k)− kf ′(k)]/H are constant;
(S2) R = 1/β1 < 1/β2 ≤ . . . ≤ 1/βH ;
(S3) k = k1 > 0, b = b1 = αf(k1) > 0 and ki = bi = 0 for i ≥ 2;
(S4) c1 = (k1 + b1)(R− 1) + (1− τ)w and ci = (1− τ)w for i ≥ 2;
(S5) G = τ(rk1 +Hw) + (1−R)b1 ≡ ∆f(k1) with ∆ = τ − α(1−β1)β1 .
Proof : See Appendix 6.1.
This Proposition shows that because of the borrowing constraints, there
exists a steady state. In accordance with the so-called Ramsey (1928) conjec-
ture and the seminal contribution of Becker (1980), the most patient household
holds the whole capital stock and government debt. Note that the debt-output
ratio has to be lower than α̂, because otherwise, the public debt burden is too
heavy and is no more compatible with a positive government spending.
4 Endogenous business cycles under public
spending externalities
In the neighborhood of the steady state exhibited in Proposition 1, the in-
tertemporal equilibrium can be summarized by a two-dimensional dynamical
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system given by the patient household’s trade-off between present and future
consumption and his budget constraint. Indeed, using Definition 1, an in-
tertemporal equilibrium can be redefined as a sequence (c1t, kt)
∞
t=0, satisfying:
u1c (c1t, Gt)
u1c (c1t+1, Gt+1)
= β1R(kt+1) (11)
kt+1 + αf(kt+1) = R(kt)[kt + αf(kt)] + (1− τ)Ω(kt)
H
− c1t (12)
with R(kt+1) = (1 − τ)f ′(kt+1) + 1 − δ, Gt = f(kt) [τ − αR(kt)] + αf(kt+1),
and where c1t is a forward variable and kt is the only predetermined variable.
We characterize the stability properties of the steady state and the occur-
rence of local bifurcations by linearizing the dynamic system (11)-(12) around
the steady state (c1, k) and computing the Jacobian matrix J , evaluated at
this steady state.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the characteristic polynomial is given
by P (λ) ≡ λ2 − Tλ+D = 0, where:
D =
B2(α)− 1cG∆1ccB3(α)B1(α)
1+
1cG
∆1cc
αsB1(α)
≡ D (α) , T = 1 +D(α) +
(1−s)θB1(α)
σ1cc
1+
1cG
∆1cc
αsB1(α)
≡ T (α)
(13)
with
B1(α) =
1−τ
β1(1−τ)+αθ
[
(1− β1)
(
1 + αθ
β1(1−τ)s
)
+ (1−s)θ
sH
]
> 0
B2(α) =
1
β1
[
1− β1θ(1−s)(1−τ)
σ[β1(1−τ)+αθ]
(
1− 1
H
+ αθ
β1(1−τ)s
)]
B3(α) =
s(τβ1−α)
β1
+ α(1−s)θ
σβ1
(14)
Proof : See Appendix 6.2.
As shown by Becker and Foias (1987, 1994), the existence of endogenous
fluctuations in a standard Ramsey model with heterogeneous agents and bor-
rowing constraints can be obtained only if the capital income monotonicity
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assumption is not satisfied. Actually, capital income monotonicity holds if
f ′(k)k is an increasing function of k. At the steady state, it can be easily
shown that the capital income monotonicity holds if
σ > 1− s ≡ σCIM (15)
Recent papers have explored the empirical value of the elasticity of capital-
labor substitution and questioned the empirical relevance of the Cobb-Douglas
specification which is widely used in growth theory. They find that capital
and labor have an elasticity of substitution significantly different than unity.
However, empirical evidences for both gross substitutability (elasticity above
one) and gross complementarity (elasticity below one) of capital and labor are
obtained in the literature. For instance, Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) report
robust estimates that are contained in [1.24, 3.24] and Krusell et al. (2007) find
an elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor and equipment of 1.67. On
the contrary, Chirinko (2008), Klump et al. (2007) and Leo´n-Ledesma et al.
(2010) provide robust estimates in the range [0.4, 0.6]. When s = 0.3, we get
σCIM = 0.7 a value which is precisely in between all the available empirical
estimates. We then need to study both cases σ < σCIM and σ > σCIM .
We start by considering an economy without debt. Our aim is then to
show that, since public spending externalities affect utility of consumption,
endogenous business cycles can occur in the Ramsey model with heterogeneous
agents for any value of the elasticity of capital-labor substitution, and in par-
ticular even in the case where capital income monotonicity holds. Nishimura
et al. (2013) have recently exhibited the existence of endogenous fluctuations
through the occurrence of local indeterminacy in a similar Ramsey model with
government spending financed by linear income taxes but without public debt
and augmented to include endogenous labor.
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4.1 The Ramsey economy without debt
The equilibrium without debt is obviously obtained when α = 0. We then get
the following Proposition:
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1-2, let α = 0. Then there exist ¯1cG >
1cG ≥ 0, σˆ < σ˜ < σCIM and ¯1cc > 0 such that the following results hold:
i) if σ > σ˜, the steady state is saddle-point stable with monotone conver-
gence when 1cG ∈ (0, 1cG), saddle-point stable with damped oscillations when
1cG ∈ (1cG, ¯1cG), undergoes a flip bifurcation for 1cG = ¯1cG, and becomes
locally unstable when 1cG > ¯1cG;
ii) if σ ∈ (σˆ, σ˜), the steady state is saddle-point stable with damped oscil-
lations when 1cG ∈ (0, ¯1cG), undergoes a flip bifurcation for 1cG = ¯1cG, and
becomes locally unstable when 1cG > ¯1cG;
iii) if σ ∈ (0, σˆ) and 1cc < ¯1cc, the steady state is saddle-point stable
with damped oscillations when 1cG ∈ (0, ¯1cG), undergoes a flip bifurcation for
1cG = ¯1cG, and becomes locally unstable when 1cG > ¯1cG.
In all cases, saddle-point stable (locally unstable) period-two cycles occur in a
right (left) neighborhood of ¯1cG.
Proof : See Appendix 6.3.
This Proposition shows that endogenous business cycles emerge through a
flip bifurcation even when the capital income monotonicity assumption is sat-
isfied, provided the government spending externality is large enough. Indeed,
if σ > σCIM , case i) of Proposition 2 applies. This is at odds with the non
monotonicity of capital income required to get period-two cycles in the model
without public spending externalities (Becker and Foias (1987, 1994)).
Of course, when there is no externality, i.e. 1cG = 0, we get as a Corollary
the same conclusions as in Becker and Foias (1987, 1994):
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Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1-2, let α = 0 and 1cG = 0. Then there
exist σˆ < σ˜ < σCIM and ¯1cc > 0 such that the following results hold:
i) if σ > σ˜, the steady state is saddle-point stable with monotone conver-
gence for any 1cc > 0;
ii) if σ ∈ (σˆ, σ˜), the steady state is saddle-point stable with damped oscil-
lations for any 1cc > 0;
iii) if σ ∈ (0, σˆ), the steady state is saddle-point stable with damped os-
cillations when 1cc ∈ (0, ¯1cc), undergoes a flip bifurcation for 1cc = ¯1cc, and
becomes locally unstable when 1cc > ¯1cc. Moreover, saddle-point stable (locally
unstable) period-two cycles occur in a right (left) neighborhood of ¯1cc.
4.2 The Ramsey economy with debt
Let us now consider the case with debt assuming α ∈ (0, αˆ). Our aim is to
check whether debt has a stabilizing or a destabilizing effect on the economy.
Put differently, we are looking for some conditions on the share α of debt over
GDP that allow to generate or rule out endogenous fluctuations. Building on
the results derived in the no-debt case, we show that the conclusions strongly
depend on the value of the elasticity of capital-labor substitution.
We start by analyzing the standard formulation of Becker and Foias (1987,
1994) without public spending externality in the utility function. Indeed, it
is worth noting from Lemma 1 that when 1cG = 0, the Determinant and
Trace of the characteristic polynomial are linear functions of the share α. This
monotonicity property allows to derive the following clear-cut conclusions:
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1-2, let 1cG = 0. Then there exist β1 ∈
(0, 1), σ¯ > σ > σ˜ > σˆ, ¯1cc > ˜1cc and αˆ ≥ α¯ > α ≥ 0 such that when
β1 ∈ (β1, 1) the following results hold:
i) Public debt does not have any impact on the local stability properties of
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the steady state when σ ≥ σ¯, or σ ∈ (σˆ, σ˜) and 1cc ≤ ˜1cc, or σ ∈ (0, σˆ) and
1cc ∈ (0, ˜1cc] ∪ (¯1cc,+∞).
ii) Public debt has a destabilizing effect in the following cases:
- when σ ∈ (σ, σ¯), or σ ∈ (σ˜, σ) and 1cc ≤ ˜1cc. Indeed, the steady
state is saddle-point stable with monotone convergence when α ∈ [0, α) and
saddle-point stable with damped fluctuations when α ∈ (α, αˆ).
- when σ ∈ (σ˜, σ) and 1cc > ˜1cc. Indeed, the steady state is saddle-
point stable with monotone convergence when α ∈ [0, α), saddle-point stable
with damped fluctuations when α ∈ (α, α¯), undergoes a flip bifurcation when
α = α¯ and becomes locally unstable with oscillations when α ∈ (α¯, αˆ).
- when σ ∈ (σˆ, σ˜) and 1cc > ˜1cc. Indeed, the steady state is saddle-point
stable with damped fluctuations when α ∈ [0, α¯), undergoes a flip bifurcation
when α = α¯ and becomes locally unstable with oscillations when α ∈ (α¯, αˆ).
- when σ ∈ (0, σˆ) and 1cc ∈ (˜1cc, ¯1cc). Indeed, the steady state is
saddle-point stable with damped fluctuations when α ∈ [0, α¯), undergoes a flip
bifurcation when α = α¯ and becomes locally unstable with oscillations when
α ∈ (α¯, αˆ).
Moreover, in all cases where α¯ exists, there are saddle-point stable (locally
unstable) period-two cycles in a right (left) neighborhood of α¯.
Proof : See Appendix 6.4
Proposition 3 provides a complete picture of the impact of public debt
on the local stability properties of the steady state when there is no public
spending externality in preferences, i.e. 1cG = 0. We have then clearly shown
that when σ is low enough and 1cc is sufficiently large, public debt has a
destabilizing effect as it may create damped and/or persistent macroeconomic
fluctuations.
Let us finally consider the formulation with public spending externality
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in utility in order to check whether the destabilizing effect of debt is robust.
When 1cG > 0 the analysis becomes much more complex as the Determinant
and Trace of the characteristic polynomial are no longer linear functions of
α. We may however provide some results which show that depending on the
values of σ and 1cG, the previous conclusion does not necessarily hold as a
sufficiently large public debt may have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1-2, let δ < s < 1/2 and β1 > 1/(1 +
s − δ). Then there exist σ¯, σ > 0, satisfying σCIM > σ¯ > σ > σ˜ > σˆ,
¯1cG > 1cG > 0, ¯1cc > 0 and α¯ ∈ [0, αˆ) such that the following results hold:
1- Public debt has a stabilizing effect in the following cases:
i) when σ > σ¯. Indeed, the steady state is saddle-point stable with mono-
tone convergence when α ∈ (α¯, αˆ) no matter what are the stability properties
of the steady state in the economy without debt (i.e. for any 1cG > 0);
ii) when σ ∈ (σ, σ¯) and 1cG > ¯1cG. Indeed, the steady state is saddle-
point stable with damped oscillations when α ∈ (α¯, αˆ) while in the economy
without debt it is unstable with possible persistent fluctuations (period-two cy-
cles) in the left neighborhood of α¯.
2- Public debt has a destabilizing effect in the following cases:
i) when σ ∈ (σ, σ¯) and 1cG ∈ (0, 1cG). Indeed, the steady state is
saddle-point stable with damped oscillations when α ∈ (α¯, αˆ) while in the econ-
omy without debt it is saddle-point stable with monotone convergence;
ii) when σ ∈ (σ˜, σ) and 1cG ∈ (0, ¯1cG). Indeed, the steady state is to-
tally unstable with oscillations when α ∈ (α¯, αˆ) and there exist saddle-point sta-
ble (locally unstable) period-two cycles in a right (left) neighborhood of α¯, while
in the economy without debt it is saddle-point stable with monotone convergence
(when 1cG ∈ (0, 1cG)) or damped oscillations (when 1cG ∈ (1cG, ¯1cG));
iii) when 1cG ∈ (0, 1cG) and either σ ∈ (σˆ, σ˜), or σ ∈ (0, σˆ) and
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1cc ∈ (0, ¯1cc). Indeed, the steady state is totally unstable with oscillations
when α ∈ (α¯, αˆ) and there exist saddle-point stable (locally unstable) period-
two cycles in a right (left) neighborhood of α¯, while in the economy without
debt it is saddle-point stable with damped oscillations.
Proof : See Appendix 6.5
Case 1-i) in Proposition 4 covers the configuration in which the capital
income monotonicity (i.e. inequality (15)) holds. This result is particularly
interesting in the case where 1cG > 1cG in which there exist damped or
persistent fluctuations in the economy without debt. There is indeed a level
of public debt α¯ > 0 above which the economy does not fluctuate anymore
and converges monotonically toward its steady state. Public debt has here a
strong stabilizing effect. In case 1-ii) with a large public spending externality,
i.e. 1cG > ¯1cG, public debt also has a stabilizing effect by ruling out persistent
fluctuations.
Cases 2-i) and ii) on the contrary imply that when the capital income
monotonicity is not satisfied and the public spending externality is not too
large, a large enough level of public debt with respect to GDP may destabilize
the economy by generating endogenous fluctuations while the economy with-
out debt is characterized by monotone convergence towards the steady state.
Public debt has now a strong destabilizing effect.
In case 2-iii), public debt still has a destabilizing effect but which is less
radical as it amplifies fluctuations by generating persistent cycles while the
economy without debt is characterized by damped fluctuations.
To summarize, Propositions 3 and 4 show that public debt has a stabilizing
effect for large values of σ and 1cG, while it has a destabilizing effect for
low values of σ and 1cG. We then need to provide some economic intuitions
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for these results. But before that we can derive some conclusions on the
consequences of the stabilization effect of public debt on inequalities.
4.3 The impact on inequalities
As initially shown by Becker (1980), inequalities occur in Ramsey models as the
most patient holds all the capital and thus receives capital and labor incomes,
while all the other agents only receive labor income. A possible measure of
inequalities can then be provided by the ratio of patient over impatient agents’
incomes which is proportional to the following expression
I(k) = R(k) [k + αf(k)]
Ω(k)
Straightforward computations show that
I ′(k) ≷ 0 ⇔ σ ≷ 1+
αθ
β1(1−τ)(
1+ αθ
β1s(1−τ)
)
[θ(1−s)+s] ≡ σI (16)
and we derive the following result:
Lemma 2. There exist β
1
∈ (0, 1) and δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that when δ ∈ (0, δ¯)
and β1 ∈ (β1, 1), then σI > 1 for any α ∈ [0, αˆ).
Proof : See Appendix 6.6
Depending on whether σ is larger or lower than σI , inequalities increase or
decrease along an optimal growth path where capital is monotonically grow-
ing. Considering this result together with Propositions 3 and 4, we can then
derive some conclusions on the impact of public debt on inequalities when the
proportion α is used as a policy instrument to stabilize the economy, i.e. that
leads to a saddle-point steady state with monotone convergence.
Corollary 2. Under Assumptions 1-2, let δ ∈ (0, δ¯) and β1 ∈ (β1, 1) with β1
and δ¯ as given by Lemma 2. Consider also the bounds σ¯ > σ > σ˜ and 1cG as
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given by Proposition 4. Then there exists αI ∈ (0, αˆ) such that the following
results hold:
1- When σ > σI, the steady state is saddle-point stable with monotone
convergence and inequalities are pro-cyclical if α ∈ (αI , αˆ). A large enough
public debt stabilizes but increases inequalities.
2- When σ ∈ (σ¯, σI), the steady state is saddle-point stable with monotone
convergence and inequalities are counter-cyclical if α ∈ (αI , αˆ). A large enough
public debt stabilizes and decreases inequalities.
3- When σ ∈ (σ˜, σ¯) and 1cG ∈ (0, 1cG), the steady state is saddle-point
stable with monotone convergence and inequalities are counter-cyclical if α ∈
[0, αI). A low enough public debt stabilizes and decreases inequalities.
Note that when σ is lower than σ˜, a low enough public debt leads to a
saddle-point steady state but with damped fluctuations. In such a case, the
impact on inequalities is less clear as inequalities, being counter-cyclical, will
successively increase and decrease along the fluctuations.
4.4 Economic interpretation
To give an economic intuition of our previous results, we recall that using the
utility function u1(c1t, Gt) = c
1−1cc
1t G
1cG
t /(1− 1cc), the two dynamic equations
that govern the dynamics can be written:
c1t + kt+1 + bt+1 = R(kt)(kt + bt) + (1− τ)w(kt)/H ≡ It (17)(
c1t+1
c1t
)1cc (
Gt
Gt+1
)1cG
= β1R(kt+1) (18)
with bt = αf(kt), Gt = f(kt)(τ −αR(kt)) +αf(kt+1) and R(kt) = 1− δ+ (1−
τ)f ′(kt).
As shown by Propositions 3 and 4, when 1cG is weak enough, public debt
can only have a destabilizing effect. To understand this property, assume for
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simplicity that there is no public spending externality (1cG = 0) and consider
first that there is no debt (α = 0). As stressed by Becker and Foias (1994), a
necessary condition to have oscillations and cycles of period 2 is that capital
income monotonicity fails, i.e. capital income is decreasing in capital. More
precisely, as shown in Corollary 1, we need that σ < θ(1 − s)(1 − 1/H) ≡ σ˜.
In this case, following an increase of kt, the income It decreases, implying a
decrease of kt+1 and explaining non-monotone dynamic paths and endogenous
cycles. Note that 1cc needs to be large enough to prevent any intertemporal
arbitrage.
Consider now the case with debt α > 0. Since the patient household holds
two assets, capital and public debt, we argue that oscillations and instability
are explained by the same mechanism than before, except that it requires
now the lack of asset income monotonicity. Asset income R(kt)(kt + bt) =
R(kt)(kt + αf(kt)) is decreasing in kt if σ < θ(1 − s)(1 + b/k)/(1 + sb/k)
with b/k = αθ/[sβ1(1− τ)]. It follows therefore that an increase of kt will be
followed by a decrease of kt+1 if the income It is again a decreasing function
of kt, namely if
σ < θ(1−s)(1−1/H+b/k)
1+sb/k
≡ σ˜α
with σ˜α an increasing function of α. Assume then that when α = 0, the econ-
omy is not subject to fluctuations with σ ∈ (σ˜, σ˜αˆ).9 Then there necessarily
exists a level of debt-output ratio above which σ < σ˜α and endogenous fluc-
tuations occur. This explains that public debt has a destabilizing effect since
when α raises, the range of input substitutions for saddle-point stability with
monotone convergence reduces.
9The upper bound σ˜αˆ is given by
σ˜αˆ =
θ(1−s)[1−1/H)s(1−τ)(1−β1)+τθ]
(1−τ)(1−β1)+τθ
and occurs as the destabilizing effect of debt requires a low enough elasticity of capital-labor
substitution.
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Consider finally the case where 1cG is large enough. Proposition 4 shows
that when σ is large enough (in particular if σ > σ¯(> σ˜)), public debt has
on the contrary a stabilizing effect. To understand this property, assume for
simplicity that 1cc = 0 and consider first that there is no debt (α = 0).
Since σ > σ¯, following an increase of kt, the income It increases. There are
oscillations and cycles of period 2 if kt+1 decreases. This implies an increase of
R(kt+1), but requires also a strong increase of c1t. When 1cG is equal to 0 or is
sufficiently low, this is not compatible with the Euler equation (18), since the
right-hand side is increasing and the left-hand side is almost constant. On the
contrary, when 1cG is sufficiently large, since Gt = τf(kt), the dominant effect
on the left-hand side of (18) comes from Gt/Gt+1 = f(kt)/f(kt+1). When kt
increases and kt+1 decreases, this ratio increases, meaning that the left-hand
side of the Euler equation becomes compatible with the raise of R(kt+1).
Consider now the case with debt α > 0. We have:
dGt
G
= f(k)
β1G
[
s(τβ1 − α) + θ(1−s)ασ
]
dkt
k
+ s b
G
dkt+1
k
(19)
This means that for any α > 0, Gt is procyclical (dGt/dkt+1 > 0) with re-
spect to k+1. On the contrary, depending on whether α is low or sufficiently
large (in any case larger than τβ1), Gt is either procyclical or countercyclical
(dGt/dkt < 0) with respect to kt. Consider a sequence of capital stock with
oscillations, i.e. kt larger, kt+1 lower and kt+2 larger again. When α is suffi-
ciently large, Gt is lower, Gt+1 larger, meaning that the ratio Gt/Gt+1 is lower
(i.e. procyclical with respect to kt+1). By direct inspection of equation (18),
this is not compatible with a larger R(kt+1), explaining that when inputs are
high substitutes, public debt has a stabilizing effect since a sufficiently large α
promotes saddle-point stability with monotone convergence.
Our results also show that when α is low or equal to zero, government
spending is procyclical and the externalities destabilize as in the standard
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literature (see for instance Cazzavillan (1996) and Zhang (2000)). On the
contrary, we prove that when α is large enough, government spending becomes
countercyclical along the cycle and the externalities stabilize. These opposite
conclusions are easily explained by the fact that in these two cases, as 1cG > 0,
government spending has opposite effects on marginal utility.
5 Conclusion
Public debt is introduced in a Ramsey model with heterogenous agents and
a public spending externality affecting utility. Public spending is financed
by income tax and debt, which is assumed to be a fixed proportion of GDP.
We show that depending on the size of the externality and the value of the
elasticity of capital-labor substitution, public debt can have a stabilizing or
destabilizing effect by ruling out, or promoting the occurrence of endogenous
fluctuations. When the public spending externality is weak, government debt
can only be destabilizing, by creating damped or persistent macroeconomic
fluctuations when the elasticity of capital labor substitution is low enough.
But when the public spending externality is strong enough, public debt can
also be stabilizing for large values of the elasticity of capital labor substitution,
driving to saddle-point stability, and thus monotone convergence, an economy
experiencing damped or persistent fluctuations without debt. We also show
that when the ratio of public debt over GDP is used as a policy instrument to
stabilize the economy, it can also decrease or increase the degree of inequalities
depending on whether the elasticity of capital-labor substitution is large or low.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of this Proposition consists in three steps.
Step 1. For i = 1, (S2)-(S4) satisfy the optimality conditions (2), (4) and
(5). Moreover, since c1, k1, b1 and G are constant and 0 < β1 < 1, the transver-
sality conditions limt→+∞ βt1u1c (c1, G) k1 = 0 and limt→+∞ β
t
1u1c (c1, G) b1 = 0
hold.
Step 2. For i ≥ 2, given G, consider the feasible sequence
(
k˜it, b˜it, c˜it
)
,
starting from k˜i0 = b˜i0 = 0. We now compare this path with the stationary
solution ci, such that ki = bi = 0 and ci = (1 − τ)w, and show that the
stationary solution is optimal.
+∞∑
t=0
βti [ui (ci, G)− ui (c˜it, G)]
≥
+∞∑
t=0
βtiuic ((1− τ)w,G) [(1− τ)w − c˜it]
= uic ((1− τ)w,G) lim
T→+∞
[
βTi (k˜iT+1 + b˜iT+1) + (1/βi − 1/β1)
T∑
t=1
βti(k˜it + b˜it)
− (k˜i0 + b˜i0)/β1
]
≥ −uic ((1− τ)w,G) (k˜i0 + b˜i0)/β1 = 0
Step 3. Under Assumption 2, there is a unique finite and strictly positive
value of k such that f ′ (k) = θ/β1(1− τ). We further note that:
1. If R > 1
β1
, i.e. f ′ (k) > θ/β1(1 − τ), then it is optimal for the most pa-
tient household to increase capital. This cannot be a stationary solution
because of decreasing returns in capital.
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2. If R < 1/β1 < 1/β2 ≤ . . . ≤ 1/βH , i.e. f ′ (k) < θ/(1 − τ)β1, each
household decumulates to zero. Then kt tends to 0 and f
′ (kt) to +∞,
violating stationarity.
It follows that, if α ∈ [0, αˆ) with αˆ = τβ1/(1 − β1), then k1 = k, b1 =
αf(k1), G = τ(rk1 + Hw) + (1 − R)b1 ≡ ∆f(k1) with ∆ = τ − α(1−β1)β1 > 0.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Linearizing the dynamic system (11)-(12) around the steady state, we obtain:
dkt+1
k
= B2(α)
dkt
k
−B1(α)dc1tc1[
1 + 1cG
∆1cc
αsB1(α)
]
dc1t+1
c1
− 1cG
∆1cc
[
B3(α)− αs− (1−s)θ∆σ1cG + αsB2(α)
]
dkt+1
k
= dc1t
c1
− 1cG
∆1cc
B3(α)
dkt
k
with B1(α), B2(α) and B3(α) given by (14). We then derive the following
linear system  dc1t+1c1
dkt+1
k
 = J
 dc1tc1
dkt
k

with
J =
 1−
1cG
∆1cc
[
B3(α)−αs− (1−s)θ∆σ1cG +αsB2(α)
]
B1(α)
1+
1cG
∆1cc
αsB1(α)
1cG
∆1cc
[
B2(α)
[
B3(α)−αs− (1−s)θ∆σ1cG +αsB2(α)
]
−B3(α)
]
1+
1cG
∆1cc
αsB1(α)
−B1(α) B2(α)

Since T and D represent respectively the trace and the determinant of J , the
result follows after straightforward simplifications.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We start by stating a property that applies for any α ∈ [0, αˆ).
Lemma 6.1 For any α ∈ [0, αˆ), there exists one root λ1 > 1 solution of the
characteristic polynomial P (λ) ≡ λ2 − Tλ+D = 0.
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Proof. Straightforward computations from Proposition 1 give
P (1) = 1− T +D = −
(1−s)θB1(α)
σ1cc
1 + 1cG
∆1cc
αsB1(α)
< 0
Since limλ→±∞ P (λ) = +∞, the result follows.
Let α = 0. We get from Proposition 1:
D(0) = 1
β1
[
1− (1−s)θ
σ
(
1− 1
H
)− 1cG
1cc
s
(
1− β1 + (1−s)θsH
)]
and
P (−1) = 2
β1
{
1 + β1 − (1−s)θσ
[
1− 1
H
− 1
21cc
(
1− β1 + (1−s)θsH
)]
− 1cG
1cc
s
(
1− β1 + (1−s)θsH
)}
Let us introduce the following bound σ˜ ≡ (1− s)θ (1− 1
H
)
such that
1− (1−s)θ
σ
(
1− 1
H
)
T 0 ⇔ σ T σ˜
It follows that when σ > σ˜, D(0) T 0 if and only if
1cG S [
1− (1−s)θ
σ (1− 1H )]1cc
s(1−β1+ (1−s)θsH )
≡ 1cG
On the contrary, when σ < σ˜, D(0) < 0 for any 1cG > 0. Let us now introduce
a second bound
σˆ ≡ (1−s)θ(1−
1
H )
1+β1
< σ˜
such that
1 + β1 − (1−s)θσ
(
1− 1
H
)
T 0 ⇔ σ T σˆ
It follows that when σ > σˆ, P (−1) T 0 if and only if
1cG S
1+β1− (1−s)θσ
[
1− 1
H
− 1
21cc
(1−β1+ (1−s)θsH )
]
s
1cc
(1−β1+ (1−s)θsH )
≡ ¯1cG
with ¯1cG > 1cG. Finally, when σ ∈ (0, σˆ), we can define the following bound
¯1cc ≡ (1−s)θ(1−β1+
(1−s)θ
sH )
2(1+β1)(σˆ−σ) > 0
and we conclude that when 1cc < ¯1cc, P (−1) T 0 if and only if 1cG S ¯1cG.
Recall then that P (1) > 0 and limλ→±∞ P (λ) = +∞ for any α ∈ [0, αˆ). On
this basis, we conclude from Lemma 6.1 that the following results hold:
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i) if σ > σ˜, then
- the second root of the characteristic polynomial satisfies λ2 ∈ (0, 1) when
1cG ∈ [0, 1cG) and the steady state is saddle-point stable with monotone
convergence;
- the second root of the characteristic polynomial satisfies λ2 ∈ (−1, 0) when
1cG ∈ (1cG, ¯1cG), and the steady state is saddle-point stable with damped
oscillations;
- the second root of the characteristic polynomial satisfies λ2 < −1 when
1cG > ¯1cG and the steady state is totally unstable. But when 1cG = ¯1cG,
P (−1) = 0 and a flip bifurcation occurs so that saddle-point stable (locally
unstable) period-two cycles occur in a right (left) neighborhood of ¯1cG.
ii) if σ ∈ (σˆ, σ˜), the same results as in i) are satisfied with 1cG = 0.
iii) if σ ∈ (0, σˆ), the same results as in ii) are satisfied provided 1cc < ¯1cc.
On the contrary, when 1cc > ¯1cc, both characteristic roots are outside the
unit circle and the steady state is totally unstable for any 1cG ≥ 0. Note also
that if 1cG = 0, ¯1cc becomes a flip bifurcation value.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 3
If 1cG = 0, we easily derive from (13) that when α is varied over the interval
[0, αˆ), D and T evolve along the following line
D = 1−s(1−
1
H )
1−s(1− 1H )− 1−s1cc (1−β1−
θ
H )
T
− σβ1[1−s(1−
1
H )]+
σ(1−s)
1cc
(1−β1− θH )+
θ(1−s)
H
(
1+
θ(1−s)
1ccs
)
1−s(1− 1H )− 1−s1cc (1−β1−
θ
H )
≡ ST − C
(20)
We then need to compute the starting and end points of the line. We get from
Lemma 1:
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D(0) = σ−θ(1−s)(1−
1
H )
σβ1
T (0) = σ(1+β1)−θ(1−s)(1−
1
H )
σβ1
+
θ(1−s)[1−β1+ θ(1−s)sH ]
σβ11cc
D(αˆ) = σ
(
1−τ+ τθ
1−β1
)
−θ(1−s)(1−τ)
(
1− 1
H
+ τθ
(1−β1)s(1−τ)
)
σβ1
(
1−τ+ τθ
1−β1
)
T (αˆ) = σ(1+β1)
(
1−τ+ τθ
1−β1
)
−θ(1−s)(1−τ)
(
1− 1
H
+ τθ
(1−β1)s(1−τ)
)
σβ1
(
1−τ+ τθ
1−β1
)
+
θ(1−s)(1−τ)
[
(1−β1)
(
1+ τθ
(1−β1s(1−τ
)
+
θ(1−s)
sH
]
σβ11cc
(
1−τ+ τθ
1−β1
)
As shown previously, we have D(0) T 0 if and only if σ T σ˜ and P (−1)|α=0 > 0
if σ ≥ σˆ or σ < σˆ and 1cc < ¯1cc, while P (−1)|α=0 < 0 if σ < σˆ and 1cc > ¯1cc.
We also derive that D(αˆ) T 0 if and only if
σ T
θ(1−s)(1−τ)
(
1− 1
H
+ τθ
(1−β1)s(1−τ)
)
1−τ+ τθ
1−β1
≡ σ¯
with σ¯ > σ˜, and P (−1)|α=αˆ > 0 if
σ ≥ θ(1−s)(1−τ)
(
1− 1
H
+ τθ
(1−β1)s(1−τ)
)
(1+β1)
(
1−τ+ τθ
1−β1
) ≡ σ
or σ < σ and
1cc <
θ(1−s)(1−τ)
[
(1−β1)
(
1+ τθ
(1−β1)s(1−τ)
)
+
θ(1−s)
sH
]
2(1+β1)
(
1−τ+ τθ
1−β1
)
(σ−σ) ≡ ˜1cc
while P (−1)|α=αˆ < 0 if σ < σ and 1cc > ˜1cc. We also easily derive that there
exists β
1
∈ (0, 1) such that when β1 ∈ (β1, 1), σ > σ˜, so that we have the
following ranking: σ¯ > σ > σ˜ > σˆ. Moreover, when σ < σˆ we have ¯1cc > ˜1cc.
Recall finally from Lemma 6.1 that P (1) < 0 and limλ→±∞ P (λ) = +∞ for
any α ∈ [0, αˆ). We then conclude from all this:
- If σ > σ¯ then D(0) > 0, D(αˆ) > 0, P (−1)|α=0 > 0 and P (−1)|α=αˆ > 0. It
follows that the steady state is saddle-point stable with monotone convergence
for any α ∈ [0, αˆ).
- If σ ∈ (σ, σ¯) then D(0) > 0, D(αˆ) < 0, P (−1)|α=0 > 0 and P (−1)|α=αˆ >
0. It follows that there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that the steady state is saddle-
point stable with monotone convergence when α ∈ [0, α) and saddle-point
stable with damped fluctuations when α ∈ (α, αˆ).
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- If σ ∈ (σ˜, σ) then D(0) > 0, D(αˆ) < 0, P (−1)|α=0 > 0 and P (−1)|α=αˆ T 0
if and only if 1cc S ˜1cc. Therefore, when 1cc ≤ ˜1cc we get the same conclusion
as in the previous case, but when 1cc > ˜1cc, there exist αˆ > α¯ > α > 0 such
that the steady state is saddle-point stable with monotone convergence when
α ∈ [0, α), saddle-point stable with damped fluctuations when α ∈ (α, α¯),
undergoes a flip bifurcation when α = α¯ and becomes locally unstable with
oscillations when α ∈ (α¯, αˆ). Moreover, there exist saddle-point stable (locally
unstable) period-two cycles in a right (left) neighborhood of α¯.
- If σ ∈ (σˆ, σ˜) then D(0) < 0, D(αˆ) < 0, P (−1)|α=0 > 0 and P (−1)|α=αˆ T 0
if and only if 1cc S ˜1cc. Therefore, when 1cc ≤ ˜1cc the steady state is saddle-
point stable with damped fluctuations for any α ∈ [0, αˆ), but when 1cc > ˜1cc,
there exists α¯ ∈ (0, αˆ) such that the steady state is saddle-point stable with
damped fluctuations when α ∈ [0, α¯), undergoes a flip bifurcation when α = α¯
and becomes locally unstable with oscillations when α ∈ (α¯, αˆ). Moreover,
there exist saddle-point stable (locally unstable) period-two cycles in a right
(left) neighborhood of α¯.
- If σ ∈ (0, σˆ) then D(0) < 0, D(αˆ) < 0, P (−1)|α=0 T 0 if and only if
1cc S ¯1cc and P (−1)|α=αˆ T 0 if and only if 1cc S ˜1cc, with ¯1cc > ˜1cc.
Therefore, when 1cc ≤ ˜1cc the steady state is saddle-point stable with damped
fluctuations for any α ∈ [0, αˆ) and when 1cc > ¯1cc the steady state is locally
unstable with fluctuations for any α ∈ [0, αˆ). On the contrary, when 1cc ∈
(˜1cc, ¯1cc), there exists α¯ ∈ (0, αˆ) such that the steady state is saddle-point
stable with damped fluctuations when α ∈ [0, α¯), undergoes a flip bifurcation
when α = α¯ and becomes locally unstable with oscillations when α ∈ (α¯, αˆ).
Moreover, there exist saddle-point stable (locally unstable) period-two cycles
in a right (left) neighborhood of α¯.
The results follow.
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6.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Let α ∈ (0, αˆ). In the limit case α = αˆ, we get ∆ = 0 and thus from Lemma
1:
D(αˆ) = 1− (1−s)θ
σβ1s
and P (−1) = 2
(
2− (1−s)θ
σβ1s
)
It follows that D(αˆ) < 0 if and only if σ < (1− s)θ/(β1s) ≡ σ¯, and P (−1) < 0
if and only if σ < (1− s)θ/(2β1s) ≡ σ.
Assume that δ < s < 1/2 and β1 > 1/(1 + s − δ). It follows that σCIM >
σ¯ > σ. Obvious computations also show that σ¯, σ > σ˜. We then conclude
from Lemma 6.1 and Proposition 2 that there exists α¯ ∈ [0, αˆ) such that the
following results hold:
i) if σ > σ¯, for any 1cG > 0 the steady state is saddle-point stable with
monotone convergence when α ∈ (α¯, αˆ).
ii) if σ ∈ (σ, σ¯), for any 1cG > 0 the steady state is saddle-point stable
with damped oscillations when α ∈ (α¯, αˆ).
iii) if σ ∈ (0, σ), for any 1cG > 0 the steady state is totally unstable with
oscillations when α ∈ (α¯, αˆ).
The results follow considering Proposition 2 and the fact that 0 < σˆ < σ˜ <
σ < σ¯ < σCIM .
6.6 Proof of Lemma 2
Let us consider the expression of the bound σI as given by (16). We get σI > 1
if and only if
g(α) ≡ 1− θ − αθ2
β1(1−τ)s > 0
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We have g(0) > 0 and g′(α) < 0. We then need to evaluate this function at
the upper bound αˆ = τβ1/(1− β1). Using the expression of θ we derive
g(αˆ) = β1(1−β1)(1−δ)(1−τ)s−τθ
2
(1−β1)(1−τ)s
Assuming δ = 0 we get
g(αˆ) = β1(1−δ)(1−τ)s−τ(1−β1)
(1−τ)s
and this expression is strictly positive when β1 = 1. Then there exist β1 ∈ (0, 1)
and δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that when δ ∈ (0, δ¯) and β1 ∈ (β1, 1), then σI > 1 for any
α ∈ [0, αˆ).
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